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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - PARTICULAR GROUNDS FOR
DISCHARGE: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DRAWS THE LINE FOR
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE NLRB
MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
ABSTRACT
In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held
that MikLin Enterprises, owner of ten Jimmy John’s franchise restaurants,
did not violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act when it discharged several employees for protest activities related to an ongoing labor
dispute. In March 2011, MikLin employees placed posters around the Twin
Cities insinuating MikLin forced its employees to work while sick and that
the company’s sick leave policy endangered the health of its customers. As
a result, MikLin terminated the employees who organized the poster campaign and reprimanded several others. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that the employees’ actions were disloyal and calculated to harm
MikLin’s reputation, and therefore Section 7 did not protect the poster campaign. In disagreeing with the decision of the NLRB, the court highlighted a
critical tension point between administrative agencies and the judiciary as
interpreters of law. Also of practical significance, the court adopted a narrow
view of Section 7, imparting considerable latitude for North Dakota employers to terminate employees engaged in labor-related protest activities. Moreover, this decision exacerbates a previously brewing split among the federal
circuit courts of appeals, meaning North Dakota practitioners should remain
aware of conflicting Section 7 judicial interpretation.

110

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:1

I.

FACTS ............................................................................................ 111

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND .............................................................. 113
A. TENSION POINT: SECTIONS 7 AND 10(C) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT .......................................................... 114
B. JEFFERSON STANDARD AND THE EMPLOYEE DISLOYALTY
TEST ......................................................................................... 115
C. CHEVRON AND BRAND X: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ................................... 117

III.

ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 119
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION .......................................................... 120
1. The NLRB misconstrued Jefferson Standard when it ignored
the “reasonably calculated to harm” test in favor of its own
precedent ............................................................................120
2. Jefferson Standard unambiguously interpreted Sections 7
and 10(c), precluding Chevron deference to the NLRB .....121
3. The employee protest activities were so disloyal as to
provide cause for MikLin to discharge them .....................122
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION ....................................................... 123
1. Jefferson Standard should not apply when employee protest
activities specifically reference an ongoing labor dispute 124
2. The malicious motive test did not originate from Jefferson
Standard, so the court should have given the Board’s
interpretation of Section 7 deference .................................124

IV.

IMPACT ......................................................................................... 125
A. EMPLOYERS GAINED MORE LATITUDE TO DISCHARGE
EMPLOYEES FOR LABOR-RELATED PROTEST ACTIVITIES ....... 125
B. THE COURT’S NARROW VIEW OF CHEVRON AND BRAND X
RESTRICTS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES’ ABILITY TO
INTERPRET JUDICIAL DECISIONS ............................................. 127

V.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 128

2018]

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

111

I. FACTS
MikLin Enterprises, Inc. (“MikLin”) owns and operates ten Jimmy
John’s sandwich restaurants in the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota
(“Twin Cities”) area.1 Michael Mulligan serves as MikLin’s president and
his son, Robert, serves as the company’s vice president.2 The dispute that
brought about this case began in 2007, when a group of MikLin employees
attempted to unionize under the banner of the Industrial Workers of the
World (“IWW”) labor organization.3
Supporters of the IWW initially ventured to win seats on MikLin’s Board
of Directors, but failed.4 Following its first unsuccessful attempt to influence
the direction of the company, the IWW focused its attention on MikLin’s sick
leave policy, beginning in early 2011.5 When the IWW campaign started,
MikLin’s policy required sick employees to find a replacement, with failure
to follow the policy resulting in termination.6 In response to the policy, a
group of employees created posters with pictures of two identical Jimmy
John’s sandwiches side by side.7 Above one picture, the first caption read in
all capital letters, “your sandwich made by a healthy Jimmy John’s worker,”
with the other caption reading, “your sandwich made by a sick Jimmy John’s
Worker.”8 The poster continued, “Can’t tell the difference? That’s too bad
because Jimmy John’s workers don’t get paid sick days. Shoot, we can’t even
call in sick.”9 The flyer ominously concluded, “We hope your immune system is ready because you’re about to take the sandwich test.”10
Employees sympathetic to the union began their campaign in March
2011 by posting the flyers on bulletin boards in MikLin-owned Jimmy John’s
restaurants, which store managers promptly removed.11 The employees believed March was an appropriate time to initiate the campaign because it was
flu season.12 On March 10, 2011, union supporters issued a press release to

1. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The IWW filed an unfair labor practices complaint against MikLin because of the Board
of Directors election. Id. The parties eventually settled their dispute, agreeing in January 2011 to
conduct a new Board of Directors election if the IWW chose to file for a rerun election. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 815.
7. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 815.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 815.
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more than one hundred local and national news outlets, threatening to distribute thousands of posters around the Twin Cities if MikLin did not change its
sick leave policy.13 Management responded, meeting with organizers of the
campaign later that day and posting a new sick leave policy the following
week.14
The new policy established a points system, whereby MikLin would allow an employee to miss between two and four days of work without finding
a replacement before facing termination.15 The policy also reiterated that
MikLin prohibited employees experiencing flu-like symptoms from working
until twenty-four hours after they became symptom-free.16
Not satisfied with the new sick leave policy, union supporters acted on
their previous threat, posting flyers around the Twin Cities near MikLinowned stores.17 The second wave of posters added one line that included
Robert Mulligan’s personal phone number, urging the public to “let him
know you want healthy workers making your sandwich.”18 In response, management terminated six of the poster campaign organizers and sent written
warnings to three other employees.19 As a result, the IWW filed unfair labor
practices complaints against MikLin with the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”).20
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard arguments in the dispute
and issued an order on April 20, 2012, finding that MikLin violated 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1).21 The ALJ, adhering to NLRB administrative precedent, found
that the posters were intricately related to an ongoing labor dispute, and therefore, fell within the protection of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”

13. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 816. The press release also asserted MikLin restaurants violated state
health codes daily. Id. While MikLin restaurants had twice been cited for health code violations
likely resulting from ill employees over the course of 10 years, no evidence supported the contention
that health code violations frequently occurred at MikLin restaurants. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 816-17. Employees received zero points if they found a replacement. Id. However,
if employees were unable to find a replacement, they received one point if they notified management
more than an hour before their shift, two points if they notified management less than an hour before
their shift, and three points if they failed to notify management. Id. Management would terminate
employees who accumulated four points. Id.
16. Id. at 817.
17. Id.
18. Id. Robert Mulligan testified that because of the poster campaign, he became inundated
with angry calls to his personal phone. Id.
19. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 817.
20. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 818 F.3d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part en banc,
861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017).
21. MikLin Enter., Inc., 2012 WL 1387939 (2012), adopted as modified 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27
(2014).
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or “Act”).22 Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that while the protestors’ assertion they could not call in sick was “not literally true,” it constituted “protected hyperbole.”23
The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s order in a 2-1 decision on August 21,
2014.24 A majority of Board members found the union supporters’ statements were not maliciously untrue, and thus, were not so disloyal as to lose
the Act’s protection.25 In dissent, however, one Board member argued the
protestors’ statements were materially false and calculated to harm MikLin’s
reputation, concluding MikLin therefore had cause to fire the six employees
for disloyalty.26
A similar split occurred on appeal to a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In relation to the poster campaign, MikLin argued the NLRA did not protect the protestors’ activities because: (1) union supporters’ statements were either false or showed a reckless disregard for the truth; or, alternatively, (2) the poster campaign
constituted disloyal conduct.27 A 2-1 majority of the panel rejected MikLin’s
arguments and enforced the order of the Board.28 Judge Loken, in dissent,
presented similar arguments to the dissenting NLRB member, and would
have found that MikLin did not violate the Act when it fired the six employees.29 Following the panel’s decision, MikLin filed a motion for rehearing
en banc, which the court granted on June 22, 2016.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A federal court of appeals can decline to enforce an NLRB order if the
Board misapplies the law, or if substantial evidence does not support the
Board’s decision.31 A critical tension point in the National Labor Relations
Act is the dichotomy between Section 7,32 which protects employees’ rights

22. Id.
23. Id. The ALJ further reasoned that the employees’ contention regarding frequent health
code violations also stretched the truth, but remained protected because the statement pointed out
the basic argument that MikLin’s sick leave policy could result in customers becoming ill. Id.
24. MikLin Enter., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 10 (2014).
25. Id. at 6-8.
26. Id. at 12 (Johnson, M., dissenting in part).
27. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 818 F.3d 397, 406-07 (8th Cir. 2016), rev’d in part en banc,
861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017).
28. Id. at 408.
29. Id. at 414 (Loken, J., dissenting in part).
30. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, No: 14-3099, 2016 WL 4651405 (8th Cir. Jun. 22, 2016).
31. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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to collectively bargain, and Section 10(c),33 which upholds the right of employers to terminate employees for cause. The United States Supreme Court
addressed this apparent quandary in its 1953 Jefferson Standard decision,
holding that employers may discharge employees engaged in labor-related
protest activities for cause when the employees’ actions constitute disloyalty.34 Moreover, in addition to labor and employment law considerations,
federal appellate courts reviewing decisions of the NLRB must remain aware
of administrative law principles, namely deference to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of a statute under Chevron and its progeny.35
A. TENSION POINT: SECTIONS 7 AND 10(C) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
From the inception of the organized labor movement in the Nineteenth
Century, unions have sought protection from employer retaliation for members participating in labor disputes. Congress codified labor’s concerns into
law in 1935 with the passage of the NLRA.36 Specifically, Section 7 of the
Act, designated as 29 U.S.C. § 157, protects the rights of employees to collectively bargain and organize.37 Section 7 states, in relevant part, “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining.”38 Significantly, Section 7 protects not only members
of labor unions, but also those supporting a labor union’s activities.39 Section
8(a)(1) of the Act further directs the NLRB to hold employers engaged in
restricting Section 7 rights accountable for maintaining unfair labor practices.40 The protections of Section 7 are not absolute, however.41

33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
34. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 364 U.S. 464 (1953).
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
38. Id.
39. Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activity under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 790 (1989).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
41. See e.g. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254 (1939) (holding employee seizure of factory during strike constituted unlawful activity and proper grounds for discharge); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding employee disclosure of confidential company information during union organizing campaign provided grounds for
discharge).
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The NLRB and federal courts have established exceptions that curtail
employee rights to collectively bargain and support union activity.42 The
most frequent exception to Section 7 derives from Section 10(c) of the
NLRA, which retains the right of employers to terminate employees for
cause.43 The statute reads, “No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee . . . if such individual was suspended
or discharged for cause.”44
The apparent clash between Sections 7 and 10(c) of the NLRA has provided fertile ground for litigation.45 This includes not only administrative
bodies, but also the federal circuit courts of appeals, to which litigants may
directly appeal orders of the Board.46 Courts first must determine whether
the activity falls within Section 7 protection, and then discern whether an
administrative or judicial exception precludes application of Section 7.47
As Professor Branscomb explained, the Board and courts initially reserved exceptions under Section 10(c) for blatant insubordination, hijacking
an employer’s means of production, or other “indefensible” employee actions.48 However, the United States Supreme Court significantly expanded
the scope of Section 7 exceptions with its 1953 Jefferson Standard decision.49
B. JEFFERSON STANDARD AND THE EMPLOYEE DISLOYALTY TEST
The United States Supreme Court tackled the dichotomy between Sections 7 and 10(c) of the NLRA in its National Labor Relations Board v. Local
Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“Jefferson Standard”)50 decision.51 In Jefferson Standard, employees organized under a chapter of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers entered
into negotiations to form a collective bargaining agreement with their employer, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company.52 The company and the
42. Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV.
291, 298 (1993).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
44. Id.
45. Fischl, supra note 39, at 789-90.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2012).
47. Branscomb, supra note 42, at 310-11.
48. Id. at 299-300.
49. Id. at 300.
50. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers represented employees of Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting Co. in the labor dispute that led to the NLRB action. Id. The case is referred to commonly as Jefferson Standard.
51. Id. at 475.
52. Id. at 467.
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union disagreed as to whether an employee had an automatic right to arbitration upon termination, or if the company could first determine whether the
termination necessitated arbitration.53 As a result, several employees formed
a picket line outside of regular work hours to protest the company’s handling
of the labor negotiations.54 Several employees soon grew impatient with this
strategy, however, and distributed more than 5000 handbills criticizing Jefferson Standard’s broadcasting business.55 The handbills did not mention the
labor dispute between the union employees and the broadcasting company.56
As a result, the company terminated ten employees responsible for distributing or sponsoring the handbills.57
Justice Burton, writing for a 6-3 majority, reasoned the handbills constituted “a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s
product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to harm
the company’s reputation and reduce its income.”58 The Court also noted the
attack came at “a critical time in the initiation of the company’s television
service.”59 The Court further explained the employee’s disloyal actions provided grounds for the company to discharge them under Section 10(c).60 Accordingly, the Court held the NLRB could not reinstate the terminated employees because the broadcasting company properly discharged the
employees for cause.61
The dissent countered that the majority’s new disloyalty principle eviscerated Section 7 rights.62 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black and
Douglas, argued that interpreting Section 10(c) to include discharge for disloyalty was inconsistent with Congress’ intent in passing the NLRA.63 Justice Frankfurter asserted, “Many of the legally recognized tactics and weapons of labor would readily be condemned for ‘disloyalty’ were they
employed between man and man in friendly personal relations.”64 The dissent also contended the Jefferson Standard disloyalty test would not be of
use to future courts and should be confined to the facts of the case.65
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 477.
Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 481.
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Despite Justice Frankfurter’s reservations about the future applicability
of Jefferson Standard, the disloyalty principle remains a core exception to
Section 7 protection. Since the 1953 decision, the NLRB has developed the
disloyalty principle “considerably.”66 The Board clearly laid out the modern
disloyalty standard in its own MikLin decision when it stated, “To lose the
Act’s protection as an act of disloyalty, an employee’s public criticism of an
employer must evidence a malicious motive.”67 The Board further articulated, “[E]ven communications that raise highly sensitive issues such as public safety [are] protected where they are sufficiently linked to a legitimate
labor dispute and are not maliciously motivated to harm the employer.”68
Thus, today's circuit courts of appeals are faced with determining whether the
Board’s malicious motive test can be reconciled with Jefferson Standard.69
C. CHEVRON AND BRAND X: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Federal appellate courts also must remain vigilant for bedrock principles
of administrative law when reviewing NLRB orders. In its landmark Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.70 decision, the
Supreme Court articulated the modern standard for judicial deference to the
statutory interpretation of an administrative agency.71 In Chevron, the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged an Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) rule that interpreted the term “stationary source” in the context of the Clean Air Act.72 Significantly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found no Congressional intent existed as
to the meaning of a “stationary source.”73 The appeals court nonetheless held
the EPA stationary source rule was “inappropriate” in the context of the
Clean Air Act based on the court’s own construction of the statute.74
On appeal from the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down a twopart test for the judiciary to apply when confronted with a rulemaking

66. MikLin Enter., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 6 n. 18 (2014).
67. Id. at 5 (quoting Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1252 (2007).
68. Id. at 6.
69. Compare MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812, 821–22 (holding the NLRB’s reliance on the malicious motive test impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard) (8th Cir. 2017) (en
banc), with DIRECTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming the NLRB’s
malicious motive standard).
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 834, 837 (1984).
71. Id. at 842-43.
72. Id. at 840.
73. Id. at 841.
74. Id.
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agency’s interpretation of a statute.75 First, if Congress has directly addressed an issue, both the judiciary and the bureaucracy must give effect to
the express will of the legislative branch.76 Second, if Congress has not spoken directly on an issue and an administrative agency has promulgated a rule
on that issue, the judiciary is not permitted to impose its own construction of
the statute that the administrative agency relied upon.77 Rather, the court’s
task is to determine if the administrative agency’s rule is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”78 Relying on the two-part test, the Court
explained that the D.C. Circuit erred when it struck down the EPA regulation
as “inappropriate” absent specific congressional intent on the issue.79 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the appeals court should not have imposed its
own construction of the Clean Air Act, but rather determined whether the
EPA’s interpretation of the Act was “reasonable.”80 Therefore, the high
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld the EPA rule.81
Two decades later, the judiciary and bureaucracy again squared off in
the Supreme Court, this time over whether an administrative agency is bound
to follow a judicial interpretation of a statute.82 In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Service,83 the Court addressed a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) ruling determining
whether broadband cable internet service constituted an “information service,” a “telecommunications service,” or both, under the Telecommunications Act of 1966.84 The FCC initially classified broadband providers as an
“information service,” but not a “telecommunications service.”85 A flurry of
litigation resulted as broadband providers sought classification as a “telecommunications service,” and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit took up consolidated appeals in the dispute.86 Rather than address the
FCC ruling on Chevron grounds, the Ninth Circuit relied on its own precedent to resolve the case, which held that cable modem providers were a “telecommunications service.”87
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 842.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 866.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 977.
Id. at 977-78.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 979 (citing AT & T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-880 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court expanded on its Chevron
decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.88 The Court determined, “Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”89 The Court explained the principle originated from Chevron because Congress explicitly
delegated authority to promulgate rules emanating from federal statutes to
administrative agencies.90 Therefore, the Court held the Ninth Circuit erred
in overruling the FCC based on its own precedent, and instead should have
deferred to the reasonable construction of the statute the FCC relied upon.91
Finally, while courts typically defer to an agency’s construction of a statute, the judiciary has remained hesitant to enforce orders of the NLRB when
doing so would result in the erosion of judicial precedent.92 Two Supreme
Court cases illustrate this trend. In Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,93 the Court refused to enforce an order of the Board that attempted to morph a long-held judicial rule into a multi-factor balancing test.94
The crux of the Court’s reasoning was that adoption of the NLRB’s test
would have “significantly erod[ed]” prior caselaw.95 Likewise, in National
Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoreman’s Association,96 the
high Court remanded a labor dispute for further fact finding because the
Board “misconstrued” the Supreme Court’s caselaw regarding whether a type
of labor could be the subject of a work preservation agreement.97 Thus, when
reviewing decisions of the NLRB, federal appellate courts must consider not
only labor and employment law, but also administrative law and the role of
the judiciary in the federal system.
III. ANALYSIS
In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,98 Judge
Loken, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Industrial Workers of the

88. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
89. Id. at 982-83.
90. Id. at 983.
91. Id. at 984.
92. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n,
473 U.S. 61 (1985).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 538.
95. Id.
96. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 473 U.S. at 61.
97. Id. at 80.
98. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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World supporters’ activities were disloyal and calculated to harm MikLin’s
reputation.99 Furthermore, the majority found that Chevron did not apply
because Jefferson Standard unambiguously interpreted Section 7 to require
the reasonably calculated to harm test, which the Board improperly discarded
when it focused instead on its own malicious motive test.100 In dissent, Judge
Kelly argued that the court should have afforded the NLRB deference under
Chevron, and that Jefferson Standard did not apply.101
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Judge Loken, writing for the majority after dissenting from the Eighth
Circuit’s first MikLin decision, began the court’s analysis by refuting the dissent’s contention that Jefferson Standard did not apply because the posters
referenced a labor dispute.102 Next, the court explained the NLRB implicitly
and improperly overruled Jefferson Standard when it employed its own subjective malicious motive test, rather than the Supreme Court’s objective “reasonably calculated to harm” test.103 The court proceeded to reject the dissent’s second argument, that Chevron and Brand X required the court to defer
to the decision of the NLRB, on the grounds that Jefferson Standard required
the Board to apply an objective disloyalty test.104 Finally, relying on the
court’s interpretation of Jefferson Standard, the court reasoned the IWW supporters’ actions constituted unprotected disloyalty that fell outside of the protections of Section 7.105
1. The NLRB misconstrued Jefferson Standard when it ignored the
“reasonably calculated to harm” test in favor of its
own precedent
The majority first focused its attention on whether Jefferson Standard
applied to the case. The dissent argued that Jefferson Standard only applies
when employees disparage an employer without reference to a labor dispute,
and because the MikLin employees referenced sick leave in their posters, the
decision did not apply.106 The majority refuted this position, however, reasoning that the Supreme Court upheld the Section 10(c) right of employers
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 825.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 832, 835 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
MikLin, 861 F.3d at 823.
Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 832 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part).
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to terminate employees for disloyalty, even if that disloyalty presents itself
in the context of a labor dispute.107 Specifically, the court referenced a passage from Jefferson Standard that stated the employees in that case would
have lost Section 7 protection regardless of whether the actions constituted
“concerted activity” within the meaning of the NLRA.108 Therefore, the majority concluded the disloyalty principle articulated in Jefferson Standard applied.109
Next, the court addressed the NLRB’s interpretation of the Jefferson
Standard disloyalty principle. The court took issue with the NLRB’s decision to employ its own subjective test, which protected disloyal conduct under Section 7 unless the employees’ actions evidenced a malicious motive.110
The court explained that the Board misapplied Jefferson Standard in two
ways. First, the court found the Board essentially ignored the objective analysis required in Jefferson Standard, that being whether or not an employee’s
actions were “reasonably calculated to harm” the employer.111 Second, the
court reasoned that the Board’s malicious motive test impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard’s disloyalty test.112 The court pointed to the
Board’s flawed reasoning that the MikLin employees’ actions may have
harmed the reputation of the company, but that the actions were still protected
because of the lack of malicious motive.113 The court explained the NLRB’s
reasoning directly conflicted with Jefferson Standard because it disregarded
the Supreme Court’s directive that conduct undertaken to advance a Section
7 right could still constitute disloyalty.114 Accordingly, the court held the
NLRB impermissibly overruled Jefferson Standard by relying on its own
precedent and ignoring the “reasonably calculated to harm” test.115
2. Jefferson Standard unambiguously interpreted Sections 7 and
10(c), precluding Chevron deference to the NLRB
The court next addressed whether Chevron and Brand X required deference to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA. First, the majority asserted

107. Id. at 820 (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S.
464, 478 (1953)).
108. Id. (citing Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. at 477-78).
109. Id. at 821.
110. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 821.
111. Id. at 821.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 821-22.
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it was doubtful that Brand X applied to the case.116 The court reasoned the
NLRB interpreted Jefferson Standard itself and did not create its own interpretation of employee disloyalty under Section 10(c).117 The majority then
explained Brand X did not require a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a judicial decision, but rather only to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute.118 Consequentially, the court determined it had the authority to impose its own interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Jefferson Standard.119
Second, and of primary importance, the court asserted the power of statutory interpretation rests primarily with the judiciary.120 The court relied on
Lechmere121 and International Longshoreman’s Association,122 explaining
the Supreme Court previously refused to enforce NLRB orders that would
have eroded judicial precedent.123 The court reasoned Jefferson Standard
clearly established that disloyalty provided employers cause to fire employees under Section 10(c).124 This unambiguous interpretation of the Act precluded Chevron deference to the Board because the NLRB’s interpretation
of Section 7 eroded the disloyalty principle articulated in Jefferson Standard.125 Therefore, the court determined the Board’s interpretation of Section
7 was not entitled to Chevron deference.126
3. The employee protest activities were so disloyal as to provide
cause for MikLin to discharge them
Finally, after ruling on the questions of law, the court addressed the merits of the case. Applying the court’s interpretation of Jefferson Standard, the
majority reasoned the posters insinuated eating at a MikLin-owned restaurant
would cause illness, which disparaged MikLin’s reputation.127 The court further explained that allegations of serious health violations against a restaurant
company constituted the “equivalent of a nuclear bomb,” and that MikLin’s
employees intentionally played on this fear by choosing March as the time to

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

MikLin, 861 F.3d at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992).
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 473 U.S. 61, 80 (1985).
MikLin, 861 F.3d at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
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attack the company because of flu season.128 Critically, the court found the
devastating nature of the employees’ attack against MikLin would outlive the
labor dispute and damage the company’s reputation for maintaining clean
establishments.129
Furthermore, the court explained that the employees’ attacks against MikLin were “materially false and misleading.”130 The statement “we can’t
even call in sick” presented on the posters was not based on fact, the court
reasoned, and the protestors’ assertion that MikLin violated health codes
every day was also misleading.131 Based on the falsehoods contained on the
posters, the court contended the posters in MikLin made an even stronger case
for disloyalty than the handbills in Jefferson Standard because the IBEW
handbills asserted only facts about the company’s broadcasting business.132
Therefore, the court found the employees’ disloyal actions fell outside of the
protections of Section 7 and accordingly declined to enforce the NLRB’s order in relevant part.133
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In dissent, Judge Kelly, joined by Judge Murphy, offered two primary
arguments against the majority’s decision to partially decline to enforce the
Board’s order. First, she argued that Jefferson Standard did not apply because the attacks in MikLin referenced an ongoing labor dispute.134 Second,
she contended the Board’s malicious motive test did not originate from Jefferson Standard, and the court should have thus deferred to the NLRB’s interpretation of Section 10(c) under Chevron.135

128. Id. (quoting Diamond Walnut Growers v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
129. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 825.
130. Id. (quoting St. Luke’s Presbyterian-Episcopal Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 575, 581
(8th Cir. 2001)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 826. The court enforced the remainder of the NLRB order, which found MikLin
responsible for three other Section 7 violations. Id. The court held that posts on an anti-union Facebook page by Robert Mulligan urging employees to remove posters around the Twin Cities violated
the Act. Id. Second, posts by MikLin supervisors on the same page disparaging union supporters
also violated the Act. Id. at 827. Finally, removal of union literature from MikLin stores at the
request of management regarding a settlement reached on the initial Board of Directors election also
violated Section 7. Id. at 828.
134. Id. at 831 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part).
135. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 835 (Kelly, J., dissenting in part).
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1. Jefferson Standard should not apply when employee protest
activities specifically reference an ongoing labor
dispute
Judge Kelly’s first argument centered around the Board’s decision to apply the employee disloyalty principle in Jefferson Standard. She disagreed
with the majority’s analysis, arguing Jefferson Standard left open the possibility that Section 7 protected protest activities specifically related to ongoing
labor disputes even when the employees’ actions were disloyal.136 The judge
asserted that because the IWW posters clearly referenced the company’s sick
leave policies, they were entitled to more protection than the handbills in Jefferson Standard, which did not explicitly reference a labor dispute.137 Judge
Kelly concluded Jefferson Standard did not foreclose the Board from finding
explicit communications referencing an ongoing labor dispute as protected
under Section 7, and thus argued the Board’s interpretation of the statute did
not overrule Jefferson Standard.138
2. The malicious motive test did not originate from Jefferson
Standard, so the court should have given the Board’s
interpretation of Section 7 deference
Judge Kelly contended second that the court should have afforded Chevron deference to the Board’s malicious motive test. The majority discarded
this argument because Jefferson Standard unambiguously foreclosed the
NLRB’s ability to formulate a test that did not include the “reasonably calculated to harm” standard.139 However, the dissent asserted the Jefferson
Standard decision did not unambiguously interpret Section 7, and the Board
was therefore free to formulate its own reasonable interpretation of the statute.140 Accordingly, the dissent pointed to Brand X and reasoned the administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute trumped the court’s interpretation.141 Judge Kelly believed the Board’s precedent was a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous issue regarding Section 7, and the court
should have therefore deferred to the NLRB malicious motive test.142

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 824.
Id. at 835.
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Id. at 836.
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IV. IMPACT
MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board will have
significant implications for labor and employment law as well as administrative law in North Dakota. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision here
creates precedent for the court to rely on in future disputes between employees engaged in labor-related protest activities and employers. Additionally,
the decision binds North Dakota federal district courts. MikLin also deepens
a split between the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the validity of
the NLRB’s malicious motive test.143 Most importantly, MikLin establishes
firm guidelines in the Eighth Circuit for clashes between the judiciary and
administrative agencies in their often-blurred roles as interpreters of law.
A. EMPLOYERS GAINED MORE LATITUDE TO DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES
FOR LABOR-RELATED PROTEST ACTIVITIES
The Eighth Circuit’s MikLin decision constrains Section 7 employee
protest rights and gives employers more latitude to discharge employees for
cause under Section 10(c). The decision allows employers to discharge employees whenever an employee attacks a company “in a manner reasonably
calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income,” regardless of whether that employee is engaged in labor-related protest activities.144
This could potentially result in a chilling effect for workers interested in joining already struggling labor unions, which have notably dwindled in size and
influence in the past three decades.145 Employees often face increased retaliation from their employers during labor disputes, and with the additional
power of employers to terminate employees for disloyalty, potential members
may be more hesitant to participate in or support unions.
Furthermore, MikLin widens a split among the federal circuit courts of
appeals, most recently between the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.146
Particularly, the two appellate courts disagree as to whether the NLRB’s malicious motive test is consistent with Jefferson Standard. While the MikLin
143. Compare DIRECTV, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 25, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2016), with Sierra Pub.
Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 220 (9th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Parr Lance Ambulance Serv., 723 F.2d
575, 578 (7th Cir. 1983); Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1980);
and Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 812, 814 (3d Cir. 1972).
144. MikLin, 861 F.3d at 824-25.
145. Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership in the United States, Article in Spotlight on Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the number of employed union members decreased by 2.9
million from 1983 to 2015.
146. Compare MikLin, 861 F.3d at 821-22, with DIRECTV, 837 F.3d at 41-42.
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court found the Board’s reliance on the malicious motive test improper, the
court in DIRECTV did not question the Board’s use of the malicious motive
test.147 Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, MasTec Advanced Technologies, co-petitioner in the DIRECTV case, filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.148 Almost immediately following
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in MikLin, MasTec filed a supplemental brief in
support of its petition.149
In its supplemental brief, MasTec relied heavily on MikLin to urge the
high Court to grant certiorari to resolve whether the NLRB’s malicious motive test comports with Jefferson Standard.150 The Board filed a brief in response to MasTec’s arguments, distinguishing the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning
from the D.C. Circuit’s.151 Most notably, the Board believed the Eighth Circuit overturned its MikLin ruling only because the Board failed to take the
“reasonably calculated to harm” test into account, and not because of the malicious motive standard itself.152 The Supreme Court ultimately denied MasTec’s petition on October 2, 2017.153 Accordingly, the question of whether
the Board’s malicious motive test satisfies Jefferson Standard will remain
open for the foreseeable future.
Interestingly, the split among Eighth Circuit judges in the MikLin decisions at both the panel and en banc level aligned with whether a Republican
or Democrat president appointed the judge.154 The Republican appointees
uniformly sided with MikLin, while the Democrat appointees dissented in
favor of the employees.155 This split may become particularly relevant if the
United States Supreme Court eventually grants a writ of certiorari to decide
whether the malicious motive test comports with Jefferson Standard.156 With
the recent confirmation of Neil Gorsuch as the Court’s fifth Republican-appointed justice, the Supreme Court may resolve the malicious motive issue
along similar ideological lines. In the meantime, North Dakota practitioners
should remain acutely aware of the conflicting interpretations the courts of

147. DIRECTV, 837 F.3d at 41-42.
148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, MasTec Advanced Tech. v. NLRB, 2017 WL 2179347
(U.S. May 11, 2017) (No. 16-1370).
149. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, MasTec, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 3405613.
150. Id. at *10.
151. Supplemental Brief for Respondent, MasTec, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 3601392 at *22.
152. Id.
153. MasTec Advanced Tech. v. NLRB, (No. 16-1370), 2017 WL 2119340 at *1.
154. Active and Senior Judges, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/active-and-senior-judges (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
155. MikLin Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 861 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
156. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 148, at *i.
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appeals have proffered on the malicious motive test and its clash with Jefferson Standard.
B. THE COURT’S NARROW VIEW OF CHEVRON AND BRAND X
RESTRICTS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES’ ABILITY TO
INTERPRET JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Finally, the MikLin decision represents the judiciary firmly staking its
position as the final interpreter of the laws of the United States. With the
rising power of the federal bureaucracy, restraints on the authority of administrative agencies are more important than ever.157 As the federal government
continues to grow, critical resolutions of disputes affecting millions of Americans are increasingly made not in the courtroom, but in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings.158 While statutory law and judicial precedent superficially bind these administrative agencies, courts must afford agency
decisions wide latitude in the wake of Supreme Court decisions such as Chevron and Brand X.159
MikLin meaningfully restricts the power of administrative agencies to
interpret judicial decisions. Importantly, the decision reinforces the principle
that the bureaucracy may not impose its own interpretation of statutes when
that interpretation erodes judicial precedent.160 More significantly, the
Eighth Circuit boldly asserted the Jefferson Standard decision unambiguously foreclosed the ability of the NLRB to discard the “reasonably calculated to harm” test.161 The holding in MikLin therefore constrains the ability
of an administrative agency to skirt around judicial precedent by relying
solely on the agency’s own administrative precedent.
The conflict between the judiciary and bureaucracy as interpreters of law
on full display in MikLin has long been a source of tension in American government. The ballooning of American bureaucracy directly threatens the
constitutional balance of government, as evidenced by Chief Justice Roberts’
statement that “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative
state cannot be dismissed.”162 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in MikLin momentarily checks the bureaucracy, but the judiciary must continue to assert

157. See Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May
24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-government/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_term=.90b41accdd5c.
158. Id.
159. See MikLin, 861 F.3d at 832 (citations omitted) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing Board
interpretations of the NLRA are entitled to “considerable deference”).
160. Id. at 824.
161. Id. at 823.
162. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

128

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:1

itself as the proper branch for interpreting the laws of the United States before
it is swallowed whole.
V. CONCLUSION
In MikLin Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down two holdings that will undoubtedly impact North Dakota practitioners. First, the court found the Jefferson Standard employee disloyalty test precluded the National Labor Relations Board from relying solely on its own precedent requiring employees
to evidence a malicious motive.163 Second, the court found Chevron deference did not apply to the NLRB’s malicious motive test because Jefferson
Standard unambiguously interpreted the Act to require an objective test for
employee disloyalty.164 Employers, labor unions, and attorneys alike should
be aware of the sweeping implications of MikLin, including the distinct possibility that the United States Supreme Court will definitively resolve these
critical issues in the future.
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